Cooperation in fleeting encounters

 

Instrumental rationality is the normative pressure for me to increase, maintain or restore my own welfare.  Cooperative rationality is the normative pressure for me to promote my own welfare as well as that of my collaborative partners, impartially.  

Evolved moral norms are impartial methods of promoting “our” mutual evolutionary fitness.  A social norm is an impartial method of cooperating in otherwise competitive circumstances (Tomasello, 2016).  

When we collaborate with strangers in a fleeting encounter, for example in a negotiation to move past each other in a crowded train carriage, when one is pushing a drinks trolley, we behave according to “as-if” agreements: we do what we would agree on if we could explicitly negotiate (Le Pargneux, Chater, and Zeitoun, 2024).  The question is, why do we do this?  Is it because we would agree on it?  If so, why would we agree on it?  What are we actually doing?  Are we explicitly maximising mutual interests impartially, or using norms that are heuristic methods for achieving the same – impartially?  The objective is to achieve impartial mutual benefit, and, whether coincidentally or not, that is what we would both agree on.  

We know why I want to maximise my interests: instrumental normativity.  Two further explanations are required: of 1) other-directed prosociality and respect; 2) impartiality between strangers.  

 

 

Other-directed prosociality and in-group mutual respect

Humans care for each other in general because we are interdependent in cooperation and sharing: we need each other, therefore we care for each other and feel compassion for other humans in general.  For me, as a group member, other group members are valuable as fellow collaborators, therefore I respect them.  

We also demand a basic level of respect from others as equals.  This is for all kinds of reasons, such as:

• I am a vulnerable human being, since I need to achieve fitness goals, which are vulnerable to not being achieved;  
• humans are egalitarian because we are “self-domesticated”;
• I recognise my value as a collaborative partner.  

 

 

Impartiality and objectivity

 

Impartiality is derived from self-other equivalence in interpersonal cooperation.  Agent independence is the scaled up, “large group” or collective version of self-other equivalence, and gives rise to group-wide moral objectivity.  Objectivity provides an agent-neutral “view from nowhere”, i.e., judgment and evaluation not tied to the interests of any particular person (Tomasello, 2016).  

Self-other equivalence is derived from the impartial, “bird’s eye” perspective of the joint agent “we”.  

When people come together to collaborate, they form a joint agent “we” which governs “you” and “I” legitimately and impartially (Tomasello, 2016).  “You” and “I” have our individual perspectives of the collaboration, and “we” carries a “bird’s eye view” perspective of all its goals, roles, and activities.  The perspective of “we” is thereby impartial: its partners are equivalent, in that they are in principle interchangeable, and are equally subject to the requirements and rules connected with their roles.  

“We” can be interpersonal, a property of individuals collaborating together, or it can be collective, a property of a whole large social group, collaborating with the joint goal of mutual thriving, surviving and reproducing.  

The proposal is that when two in-group strangers cooperate fleetingly, self-other equivalence and impartiality are part of the cooperative picture, within an objective background.  

 

 

Norms are impartial

Social and moral norms are impartial because they represent the demands of cooperation, and everyone is forced equally to bow before the physical requirements of cooperation, if they want to cooperate.  We may think of it as like going to work: the rules apply to everyone.  

More precisely: norms and their enforcement are “three-way general” (Tomasello, 2016). 1) an enforcer assumes “representative authority” of the group and can in principle be any member of the group.  2) a target of enforcement can in principle be any member of the group.  Finally, 3) the standards or norms themselves apply to any member of the group, whether they are enforced or not.   

Hence, norms are expected to apply equally to all in-group members and as-if in-group members.    

 

 

Background of compassion, fairness, cooperation and objectivity

When it comes to a fleeting interaction where competition is a possibility, therefore, we already know what to do – cooperate and coordinate according to local norms, mutual respect, and the impartial achievement of mutual benefit.  This is precisely what we would agree to (as a moral option) if we could explicitly negotiate.  Your well being is maintained impartially, my well being is maintained impartially; cooperation, norms and respect are methods of achieving this; and everyone is happy.  

 

 

References

Le Pargneux A; N Chater; and H Zeitoun (2024) – “Contractualist tendencies and reasoning in moral judgment and decision making”; Cognition. 2024 Aug; 249:105838. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105838 ; Epub 2024 Jun 1. PMID: 38824696

Tomasello, Michael (2016) – “A Natural History of Human Morality”; Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA