The morality of fairness
Introduction
The natural home of helping and fairness is cooperation towards a joint goal (Tomasello, 2020). As such, they are aspects of cooperative morality, i.e., that for which we may be held accountable (Dill and Darwall, 2014) and which has cooperation as a goal in itself (Tomasello, 2016; Perry, 2022).
The reason for each one is interdependence, whereby I depend upon you to achieve our joint goal(s). If you are necessary to me, then I need to help you to thrive and survive: hence, the human instinct to help unrelated others (Tomasello, 2016).
Why do humans routinely insist on being fair to others, even at a cost to themselves?
How can such a thing evolve in self-
We may distinguish between evolutionary reasons for the existence of other-
After achieving a joint goal together with my partners, I feel or recognise:
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Types of benefits
In the distribution of benefits after a collaboration, the benefits can be material/biological, psychological, social, and/or moral.
Types of distribution
Alan Fiske (1991) describes “four elementary forms of human relations” that really amount to four distinct ways to distribute benefit and harm:
Helping in response to need
Equally
Proportional to input
Authority-
Evolution of fairness
In order for the sense of other-
Sharing food is rare in the animal kingdom. It seems to coincide with cooperative breeding, where adults care for and provision the infants of other group members on a cooperative basis, thereby increasing the chances of survival of the young, and allowing mothers to have more than one infant at a time. Humans are a cooperatively breeding species, along with, for example, bottlenose dolphins, killer whales, elephants, parrots, crows, wolves, golden marmosets, and African hunting dogs. Apart from humans, great apes almost never share food voluntarily, unless they tolerate its being stolen.
Sharing in response to need
The most important evolutionary step in the evolution of fairness was that of voluntary
sharing with others. If I share with you when you need it, you are more likely to
survive long enough to share with me when I need it. The group forms a small-
Proportional exchanges
By around 12,000 years ago, with the advent of settled cities, groups began to grow
large and mixed, and a population could no longer govern itself morally simply through
personal interaction and the opinions of friends. As a result of this loss of personal
interaction, generous small-
This idea of proportional exchange extends to sharing rewards after collaboration in an impersonal environment. I wish to receive the same return per unit of investment as my partners (which is one form of equity).
A study by Schäfer, Haun, and Tomasello (2015) found that:
The idea of distributing benefit and harm according to a hierarchy appears in many areas of human life and society. We rank people all the time, according to an infinity of criteria.
Self-
This is the recognition, implicit or explicit, that each partner is equivalent in status from the “bird’s eye” point of view of the collaborative joint agent “we” (made up of partners “I” and “you”). Each partner is level in status in the sense that:
This factual situation does not carry any moral force in itself. Other motivations are required for it to become invoked as part of the mechanics of cooperative morality.
Golden Rule
The instinct that we should treat others as we would wish to be treated, or that
we should not do to others as we would not want done to ourselves, is based on self-
Common standards for all
The rules apply to you, and therefore to me.
The rules apply to me, and therefore to you.
People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.
Proverb
Personnel are in some senses equivalent, and normative standards apply equally to all personnel. It is consistent with this for humans to feel that the rules to apply to “me” if they apply to “you”, and vice versa.
Other examples of the application of self-
“If I were in your position I would have done the same thing”.
“How would you like it if I did that to you?”
Types of justice
Justice exists in a number of forms, all based on the idea of treating someone as an equal:
Alternative view
In the account of morality of André, Debove, Fitouchi, and Baumard (2022), morality is an evolutionary equilibrium between what we can maximise for ourselves, and how little we can get away with giving to others.
In the present account, this is only partly true: it represents the “stick” or potential
punishment of reputational damage if we are stingy, lazy, or self-
However, proximately, we also feel positive motivations to be good to our partners: a “carrot” of “I don’t have to, but I want to”. We assume that it is more likely that this motivation is based on a reward than a punishment. Wanting to be good to our partners in a fair way is a moral emotion. Without moral emotions, we would all be ungovernable, seeking only to find a way to avoid punishment. It is hard to see how moral desires can evolve without a fitness reward in it for the individual, beyond achieving a good reputation.
André et al. (2022) believe that duties are explained by this evolutionary equilibrium:
we do our duty, what is “right”, in order to achieve a good reputation and avoid
a bad one. This is again only partly true. I also do my duty, i.e. fulfil my role
properly, to reward my partners for the way they are helping me to achieve the joint
goal. This would explain the bond of loyalty we see in cooperative partners. I
also want to help to achieve the joint goal, and the ideal standards associated with
my role are sub-
It is also hard to see how the Golden Rule could have evolved by a purely reputation-
Duty, accountability, and reputation/partner choice are all functions of something deeper: i.e., the structure of morality formed by achieving goals jointly (Perry, 2022).
Without prosocial emotions, we would all be sociopaths, and human society would not exist, however strong the institutions of contract, governmental law enforcement, and reputation.
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis -
To concentrate on the reputation exclusively -
References
André, Jean-
Dill, Brendan and Stephen Darwall -
Fiske, Alan -
gov.uk web site accessed 12 February 2021: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/procedural-
Perry, Simon -
Perry, Simon -
Schäfer, Marie; Daniel B M Haun; Michael Tomasello – “Fair is not fair everywhere”: Psychological Science, Vol 26(8) 1252–1260, 2015
Tomasello, Michael -
Tomasello, Michael -