Why morality looks real and factual

 

Morality looks factual and real. This point is not in dispute. Our moral convictions are not in doubt. If I say "murder is wrong", I mean it. If you say "murder is right", I will believe that you are mistaken.

Morality looks factual and real because it operates on a conditional ought. In the abortion debate, IF my primary goal is the welfare of the foetus, THEN I factually ought to be anti-abortion. Given that's my goal, my anti-abortion activism is factually necessary and required. The IF-THEN, goals-methods construction introduces facticity. The methods of achieving the goal are factually required, if you want to achieve the goal.

Moral judgements are factually right or wrong according to moral values. A moral value is a method of achieving mutual well being; the moral "good". As such, a moral value is a goal in itself. This goal, e.g., fairness, charity, etc., can be achieved measurably, objectively, factually better or worse. We can evaluate the fairness or charity of action X; we can judge X according to multiple relevant values.

Moral realists state that the appearance of realness is enough to say that morality IS real, because when we perceive the realness of things we know are real, like the blueness of the sky, they really are real. Unless there is a defeater. In this case, there is an epistemic defeater - an alternative explanation for the appearance of the objective realness of morality.

I have the instrumental, biological, evolved goal of achieving well being, fitness benefits, utility, etc.  By definition, a moral principle is a method of achieving mutual fitness benefits.  Logically speaking, because my goal is mutual instrumental utility, I factually ought to uphold relevant moral principles.  

This explanation says nothing about proximate moral psychological motivations for behaving morally.