How “murder is wrong” is factually justified

 

 

 

Altruism and justice

 

Altruism and justice belong to the moral domain concerned with distributing goods and burdens proximately.  The goal of this domain is “the well being of all concerned”.  Other moral domains are parenting (concerned with raising children successfully); patriarchy (concerned with the domination and control of women for men's reproductive purposes); pair-bonding (concerned with enforcing and protecting pair bonds); and kin selection (concerned with genetic fitness of relatives).  There is also a stand-alone incest taboo.  That completes the range of evolved moralities.  

 

Altruism means to distribute well being to others; justice means to distribute goods and burdens according to deservingness.  Modern humans will only feel compassion for others as far as they feel they deserve it (Decety, 2011).  

 

 

 

Well being and fitness are ultimate goals

 

The unspoken goal of human beings, and the unspoken goal of moral theories, is welfare and fitness benefits.  Proximate welfare is a fitness benefit because it promotes survival and reproduction.  The reason we have evolved this goal is that natural selection favours those organisms that promote their own well being, survival and reproduction.  

 

 

 

Factual ought

 

If my goal is (factually) the proximate welfare of all concerned, then I ought (factually) to do things that promote that goal.  

 

 

 

Well being of all concerned is the highest moral good

 

“Morality” refers to the way we treat others.  The claim is that humans have evolved to see the welfare of all concerned as the highest moral good.  

 

Group-living mammals live longer than individuals of solitary species (Zhu et al., 2023).  Humans are thought to have evolved living in small groups or bands (Tomasello et al., 2012).  The inference is that humans evolved to depend on and need their fellow group-members (for sharing and cooperation).  If I need someone, then I have concern for their welfare (Roberts, 2005).  If I need my group in general, then I will have concern for my group in general.  

 

Modern hunter-gatherers will sometimes eject a troublesome group member, or family, from the small group (Boehm et al., 1993).  The group has turned its back on them, and no longer cares about them, their well being or their survival.  This is a form of justice.  

 

 

 

Why murder is factually wrong

 

Murder is factually wrong if my goal is, factually, the well being of all concerned.  If I have murdered one of us, i.e., killed them unjustly, then I have violated and contradicted this goal.  

 

 

 

Moral judgements are factual

 

Moral judgements are factual because a judgement entails evaluating how well someone has achieved a goal.  Moral judgements are done according to moral principles or ideals, and as they are means to achieving a goal (welfare and fitness benefits), they are goals in themselves.  

 

 

 

References

 

Boehm, Christopher; Harold B. Barclay; Robert Knox Dentan; Marie-Claude Dupre; Jonathan D. Hill; Susan Kent; Bruce M. Knauft; Keith F. Otterbein; Steve Rayner (1993) – “Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy [and Comments and Reply]” – Current Anthropology, Vol. 34, No.3., pp. 227-254 (Jun., 1993)

 

Decety, Jean (2011) – “The Neuroevolution of Empathy”: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1231

 

Roberts, Gilbert (2005) – “Cooperation through interdependence”: Animal Behaviour, 70, 901–908, https://www.academia.edu/28485879/Cooperation_through_interdependence

 

Tomasello, Michael; Alicia P Melis; Claudio Tennie; Emily Wyman; Esther Herrmann (2012) – “Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation – The Interdependence Hypothesis” – Current Anthropology, vol. 53, no. 6, Dec 2012

 

Zhu, Pingfen; Weiqiang Liu; Xiaoxiao Zhang; Meng Li; Gaoming Liu; Yang Yu; Zihao Li; Xuanjing Li; Juan Du; Xiao Wang; Cyril C Grueter; Ming Li; and Xuming Zhou (2023) – “Correlated evolution of social organization and lifespan in mammals”; Nature Communications (2023) 14:372;

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-35869-7