The value of moral values

 

Normativity

There are at least two philosophical views of normativity: based on value; and based on reasons, i.e., I am motivated to do X because it has value; or I am motivated to do X because I have reason to.  

In the view of Kiesewetter (2022), normativity is ultimately reasons-based, with value not always required to provide normativity.  

In the view of Perry (2026), normativity is the pressure to achieve goals, and a goal provides reasons to act.  This is a form of value-based normativity.  Normativity is an evolved motivation in that organisms have evolved to promote the achievement of their own fitness goals, because natural selection selects for this behaviour (Perry, 2026).  

 

Promising something useless

Kiesewetter cites the example of promising useless things to illustrate the point that a moral value doesn't have to have value in the world, to provide reasons to act.  I.e., I can promise my children that “I will tie my right shoelaces before my left shoelaces on alternate days of the week if they will do their homework without fuss” (p. 33).  It is a valueless promise, because no-one cares which way I tie my shoelaces.  However, the fact that a promise has been made provides inherent reasons to act, whether or not the result is useless.  To break any promise is inherently a bad thing to do.  

 

Moral principles

A moral principle or value is:

• an ideal way to collaborate (Tomasello, 2016);

• an ideal method of collaborating and/or sharing towards mutual and/or altruistic benefit (Perry, 2026);

• a solution to recurring problems in cooperation (Curry, 2016).  

Promise-keeping, on the face of it, seems to fail the “moral value” definition of Perry (2026), but it fulfils the definitions of Tomasello (2016) and Curry (2016).  It is clearly an ideal way to collaborate and a solution to recurring problems in cooperation.  So, we will class promise-keeping as a moral value or principle.  

We will illustrate moral principles using the example of fairness.  Fairness is a way to distribute goods and burdens on some kind of impartial equal basis between collaborating partners.  As such, fairness produces good in the world – it produces worldly value.

Now, humans follow moral principles for their own sake: we say things like “I must be fair”, “I must keep my promise”, whatever the potential results.  In other words, although a moral principle does not have to produce value in the world (e.g., a promise to do something useless), it is valued for itself by humans.  

Can an action have intrinsic value?  The present claim is that

• a moral principle is a behavioural formula, an abstract schema of ideal behaviour designed to bring about a valuable real-world result;   

• as such, a moral principle is valued and respected by humans for its own sake;  

• the primary value of this principle is ultimately derived from the good it is designed to do.  

To say that a principle is valued is not the same as saying it has value.  It does not have to produce value in the world to be respected and valued in itself.  We may compare a moral principle to a beautiful Rolls Royce car that sits in your garage most of the time, and is respected and valued even when it is doing nothing, instead of doing its job of transporting you around and making you look swanky to everyone (the good it is designed to do).  

 

Moral principles and the rules of marbles

If we were talking about the rules for playing marbles, instead of the rules for distributing benefit and harm to real human beings, then the matter would not have such importance.  People don't really care if someone cheats at playing marbles, beyond their playing partners.  The rules for playing marbles are not routinely respected and observed by human beings.  The rules for distributing benefit and harm are of vivid vital importance to anybody.

 

Moral motivations

There are three classes of moral motivation: 1) because I have to (obligation); 2) because I want to (volition); and 3) because I care (compassion).  The motivation to uphold a moral principle, for its own sake, is doing it “because I want to” and/or “because I care” (enough about this person).  

 

References

Curry, Oliver Scott (2016) – “Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach” in “The Evolution of Morality” (pp.27-51); Chapter: 2; Springer International Publishing

Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2022) – “Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?”; Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 17; Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.);  https://philarchive.org/archive/KIEAAP-4

Perry, Simon (2026) – “Understanding morality and ethics”; https://orangebud.co.uk/web_book_2.html

Tomasello, Michael (2016) – “A natural history of human morality”; Harvard University Press