What exactly is moral objectivity, why does it matter, does it even exist, and if so, in what form?  

 

Evolutionary ethics does without objectivity entirely, it does not rely on it for its model of morality, and seeks to explain only why people feel that morality is objective.  In this, objectivity is like any other feature of the moral landscape.  Evolutionary ethics is a descriptive model, that nevertheless can tell us what people do, and why, and why they feel they should or must act morally.  

It is unclear what moral realists are referring to, when they claim that morality is real, factual and objective.  It is also unclear how they can ever make such determinations accurately, when they do not have an adequate model of morality to interrogate.  This may be because they focus on the factual or objective nature of morality, instead of investigating the full, rounded nature of morality itself.  

 

Forms of objectivity in evolutionary ethics

 

• Group-wide similarity and standardness
• Folk perceptions of moral objectivity and relativity/culture-specific pluralism
• Conditional ought makes moral imperatives necessary and factual: to achieve moral goal G, you should do X action that promotes G.  
• Objective-feeling moral goals; patriarchal goals; religious goals; other moral domains.  Domains are morally correct according to themselves, but not necessarily to each other.  

 

Michael Tomasello’s “group-wide” objectivity and moral realism

 

• A large cultural group is “a collaborative foraging group writ large” (Tomasello, 2016).  Moral objectivity or realism is one property of large-group morality.  This is for a number of reasons.  
• Collaborative partners take the perspectives of all their fellow partners, for coordination; in a large group, the perspective is “maximally general” as all group members can take the perspectives of all others.  
• Group-wide similarity of practical methods facilitates cooperation between strangers.  
• The moral voice of the group is authoritative because the group’s ways have enabled it to survive and flourish since time immemorial.  
• Religion may further fortify the moral realism of the group, as what the gods say must be real.
• Social norms and their enforcement are “three-way general” (Tomasello, 2016). 1) an enforcer assumes “representative authority” of the group and can in principle be any member of the group.  2) a target of enforcement can in principle be any member of the group.  Finally, 3) the standards or norms themselves apply to any member of the group.  

 

Folk perceptions of moral objectivity

According to a study by Sarkissian, Knobe, and Wright (2011), ordinary people take morality to be objective – true or false – when evaluating the actions of members of their own culture, but more relativistic when evaluating people's actions from other different cultures with different moral frameworks.  

 

The conditional ought is a factual ought

An ought is only possible if you have a goal.  Without a goal to achieve, an ought is meaningless.  I “ought” to do X – but why?  To what end?  What's the point?  

With a goal, then an action has meaning relative to that goal.  The action can promote the goal or threaten it.  

The human moral goal is “maximising benefits for all concerned” (according to the evolved moral domain that regulates achieving proximate mutual benefit).  Since we do have this goal, we (factually) should do actions that promote it.  

Where does the moral legitimacy of this goal come from?  From evolution.  The human race must, logically, have found this a necessary and worthy goal from day one, since we left the forest and hit the harsh environment of the savannah, where suddenly, humans needed each other to share and cooperate with.  

 

Instrumental and moral goals

Some people say, if morality is goals-based then it's just instrumental.  However, that depends on the goal.  If the goal is moral, then the action is in the service of morality.  

Similarly, patriarchal goals feel correct to people who believe in patriarchy; and patriarchy is a moral domain.  Religious goals feel correct to people who believe in God.  Religion forms a kind of moral domain as it is a system of joint self-regulation.  

References

Sarkissian, Hagop; John Park; David Tien; Jennifer Cole Wright; and Joshua Knobe (2011) – “Folk Moral Relativism”; Mind and Language; September 2011; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263023574_Folk_Moral_Relativism

Tomasello, Michael (2016) - “A natural history of morality”; Harvard University Press