Evolutionary ethics and the structure of morality
The large-
The goals-
- instrumental normativity
- moral normativity
- moral domains and their collaborative methods of achieving joint instrumental goals
- ethical dark/light binary value of joint goals
Also included:
- Moral realism and relativism
- Comparisons with Morality-
as- Cooperation and Moral Foundations Theory - Concrete examples of moral domains and principles
- Internal features of moral domains
The logic of morality is shaped by two things: the logic of normativity, and the logic of interdependence. Interdependence requires helping others as well as oneself.
1. instrumental normativity
Instrumental normativity consists of the pressure to do the things that will allow us to thrive, survive, and/or reproduce (Perry, 2024).
The proposal is that the evolution of instrumental normativity was “self-
Normativity is defined as should-
The proposal is that the normativity evolved in two linked processes:
a. evolution of the pressure to reproduce
Those organisms that made special efforts to reproduce would reproduce more, and their genes would become more prevalent in the population, than those that did not.
b. evolution of the pressure to achieve goals
Those organisms that made special efforts to take care of their own fitness, health, and survival, would survive more often to achieve reproduction than those that did not. Therefore their genes would become more prevalent in the population than those that did not.
This is, in effect, evolutionary self-
To achieve fitness is to achieve utility; which means to achieve goals.
Achieving goals is rewarded in the organism with a feeling of pleasure. Pleasure motivates us to achieve goals. There is pressure to achieve goals. Hence, Freud's Pleasure Principle: the pressure to seek pleasure; and Eros: the pressure to reproduce.
Accordingly, a benefit may be one of thriving, surviving, and/or reproducing.
2. moral normativity
Instrumental normativity becomes moral (intra-
In order to reduce the risk of defection or dereliction by other partners, every collaboration has to begin with a joint agreement. This is usually explicit but can be implicit: i.e., the partners simply “fall into” it. The agreement places in common ground knowledge that which is expected of the cooperation and of each partner (Tomasello, 2016). This agreement is backed up by the cooperative identities, i.e., the reputations and consciences, of the partners.
The instrumental normativity of the joint goal is partly transformed within the cooperative
unit into intra-
This moral normative pressure takes the form of: 1) claims of accountability on one another; 2) feelings of responsibility towards one another, to be cooperative and to collaborate ideally.
Diagram of joint self-
3. moral domains, principles, joint goals
Collaboration and sharing are instrumentally necessary behaviour in a risky foraging niche, such as that of humans. Mutualism is necessary in a situation of interdependence. I need you to do well because I depend on you to survive (the “interdependence hypothesis” of altruism [Roberts, 2005]).
A moral domain is defined as a joint goal (mutual thriving and/or surviving and/or reproducing) together with the overall method required to achieve it. Accordingly, there are maybe five evolved moral domains:
a. collaborative foraging for mutual benefit
b. patriarchy
c. pair bonding
d. parenting
e. kin selection -
Unified structure of (evolved) morality as a family of moral domains:
Each domain is morally right according to itself, but may conflict with other domains.
Each overall method contains principles or values, which are a kind of sub-
Hence, a moral value or principle forms a sub-
Moral virtues are character traits that support moral principles, moral goals, and moral and ethical behaviour in general (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). “Most such traits incorporate a complex structure of beliefs, motives, and emotions.” (p.30) Moral virtues can be cultivated over time by the individual.
4. ethics
D is defined as:
The general tendency to maximize one's individual utility — disregarding, accepting, or malevolently provoking disutility for others —, accompanied by beliefs that serve as justifications.
Moshagen, Hilbig, and Zettler, 2018
“Dark” behaviour is defined as that which achieves my goal of utility at someone
else's expense (zero-
The proposal is that while morality regulates collaboration, ethics regulates the goals of that collaboration.
Moral realism and relativism
The “reality” of moral realism so far remains undefined. Evolutionary ethics supports a version of moral realism, in that moral principles are factual methods of achieving factual goals of factual mutual benefit.
This version of evolutionary ethics features a multiplicity of moral domains, each of which is correct according to itself. Which one is “correct” overall? We may observe that without bodily well being, no human endeavour is possible. Hence, we place “bodily well being” at the top of the tree of values (utilitarian goods).
Morality-
MAC (Curry, 2016) argues that the point of morality is cooperation: moral principles facilitate cooperation. So far, so good. However, what is the point of cooperation?
Normativity, and the goals of cooperation, are linked. Normativity is the pressure to achieve goals; instrumental goals are goals of individual utility; cooperation is an instrumental method of achieving joint goals of individual utility. Hence, there is instrumental pressure to collaborate, and moral pressure to regulate the collaboration.
Ethics refers to the dark/light binary value of goals: i.e., whether or not they are achieved at someone else's expense.
All MAC values come from two domains: collaborative foraging for mutual benefit (interpersonal and group levels), and kin selection. In not recognising normativity and its compound goal of thriving, surviving, and reproducing, MAC misses the sexual/reproductive moral domains; and the methods/goals distinction between morality and ethics.
Rather than a problem-
Putting the two approaches together, we may say that the purpose of collaboration is mutual benefit, and the purpose of morality is to regulate collaboration (Curry. 2016; Haidt, 2013; Tomasello, 2016), while morality is itself a collaboration (Tomasello, 2019).
Moral Foundations Theory has no theory behind it
MFT (Haidt, 2013) is a fine set of ethnographic observations about moral principles
that exist in nature, but it has little-
Concrete examples of moral domains and their principles
1. collaborative foraging for mutual benefit: methods (moral principles, values) of achieving mutual benefit (Curry, 2016; Haidt, 2013)
Values: altruism*, fairness, reciprocity, honesty, conflict avoidance, respecting ownership, respecting authority (benefits everyone in the legitimate organisational hierarchy of a large group), group loyalty. Curry (2016) includes heroism.
* altruism, although the action of giving is one-
2. patriarchy. Patriarchy is explained evolutionarily as a male mate-
Values / patriarchal methods of achieving mate retention and reproduction for males: assertion of the “superiority” and dominance of men; assertion of the “inferiority” and subordination of women; keeping women out of power; devaluing women and girls; female obedience to men; female chastity and modesty; women as property of men; sexual exclusivity in women but not necessarily in men; men providing resources for “their” women; men physically protecting women from other, predatory men; respecting another man’s “ownership” of his female “property”.
3. pair bonding. This is a method of mate retention, which, evolutionarily, is a method of achieving reproduction. Both mate retention and reproduction are joint goals. Pair bonding values are any that support the security of pair bonds and fidelity of mates.
4. parenting. Joint goal: reproduction, via thriving and surviving of children. As well as the joint reproductive goal of the parents, the thriving and surviving of the child is a joint goal between parents and children: both sides (normally) want it.
5. kin selection. This is supported by values such as “charity begins at home”, “blood is thicker than water”, “look after your own”, etc. The evolutionary reason for kin selection is described by Hamilton's Rule and the “selfish gene” theory popularised by Richard Dawkins: from the gene's information's point of view, it makes sense for the organism to promote the well being of other organisms who share copies of that gene (Roberts, 2005; Dawkins, 1976).
An example of a moral domain and sub-
Internal features of moral domains
Every moral domain possesses certain features, that arise from the requirement to collaborate towards a joint goal. Each feature is a source of normative pressure since it is in the service of the joint goal. Some moral domains have extra, unique features of their own.
Many of these features regulate and facilitate collaboration (Tomasello, 2016; Raihani, 2021).
- instrumental normativity = pressure to achieve instrumental goals
- joint normativity = joint pressure to achieve joint goals
- joint goal
- interdependence
- partners
- partner choice by reputation and public cooperative identity
- joint agent “we”
- joint commitment, agreement, contract to collaborate ideally
- mutual risk and normative trust
- accountability
- partner control
- promoting, enforcing, rewarding good behaviour according to values or principles
- discouraging, preventing, punishing bad behaviour according to values or principles
- joint self-
governance on behalf of the group, team, or partnership - roles and their instrumentally normative standards or ideals
- duty: sense of responsibility to (respected and valued) other partners to uphold ideal normative standards
- a set of moral values (behavioural principles; methods of collaborating to achieve
joint goals / mutual benefit; forming sub-
domains) - a set of domain-
specific moral virtues (ideal performance of roles and moral values; behavioural policies aimed at achieving the domain’s goals) - general moral virtues that apply to all moral domains
- a set of moral vices (sub-
standard performance of roles and moral values: to be avoided) - intrapersonal, interpersonal and cultural (collective) levels
References:
Beauchamp, Tom L and James F Childress – “Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Fifth Edition)”; Oxford University Press, New York 2001
Curry, Oliver Scott – “Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-
Dawkins, Richard – “The Selfish Gene”; Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1976
Haidt, Jonathan – “The Righteous Mind – why good people are divided by politics and religion”; Penguin Books, London 2013; https://moralfoundations.org/
Moshagen, Morten; Benjamin E Hilbig; and Ingo Zettler – “The Dark Core of Personality”;
Psychological Review, Vol 125(5), 656-
Perry, Simon – “Understanding morality and ethics (2nd edition)” (2024); in progress; https://orangebud.co.uk/web_book_2.html
Raihani, Nichola – “The Social Instinct – How Cooperation Shaped the World”: Jonathan Cape / Vintage / Penguin Random House, 2021
Roberts, Gilbert – “Cooperation through interdependence”: Animal Behaviour, 70, 901–908, 2005; https://www.academia.edu/28485879/Cooperation_through_interdependence
Tomasello, Michael – “A Natural History of Human Morality”; Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2016
Tomasello, Michael – “Becoming Human – a theory of ontogeny”; Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2019
