Evolutionary ethics and moral realism

 

 

 

What is the truth status of moral judgements in evolutionary ethics?  In what sense can they be true or false?  

The short answer is that a thing X is factually right or wrong according to individual moral norms or values, and X may provoke multiple of such norms or values simultaneously.  

We can say this because in the goals-methods model of morality, moral norms are methods of achieving a goal (mutual benefit), and something can factually achieve a goal better or worse than something else. What is more, the mutual benefit is real, the behaviour is real, and the rules (norms, values) exist as abstractions of reality; behavioural ideals.  

The mechanism by which X provokes a moral norm M is that X affects the mutual benefit of the kind that M is concerned with (its ultimate goal): for example, reproduction, family fitness, or proximate mutual benefit.  So, something X that threatens a person’s pair-bond ultimately threatens their reproductive benefits: so the moral principles M1, M2, ... , concerned with pair-bonding, are provoked.  Fairness is a method of achieving proximate mutual benefit on some kind of equal basis; if one equal side does not benefit, then the goal has not been reached, and this is not very fair.  

 

Moral norms are measuring sticks

A moral norm is like a measuring stick, as X may be (for example) a little fair, very fair, or not fair at all, in the way that X achieves fairness and its mutual-benefit goal.  

 

Pluralism and realism

This pluralism of moral measurements implies that traditional moral realism is wrong, as it insists on a single “right answer” for moral judgements.  In fact, there are multiple answers for each moral question, one for each relevant value at play.  If moral realism can accommodate multiple values, then it can be shown to be true.  Yet, which value is the “right”, “true” one?  

 

Justification

Moral norms are factual and mind-independent, as they exist as behavioural formula.  What is not factual and mind-independent is the endorsement of particular norms.  Patriarchy includes a set of moral norms about how men and women should behave: men should not be gay; women should be quiet and docile and not sluts.  Patriarchy is correct and legitimate according to itself, yet many people do not endorse it, so they do not use it as a moral yardstick of human behaviour.  For these people, patriarchy is not justified.  For other people who do endorse it, it is.  

The current proposal is that moral beliefs are justified – worthwhile – for three reasons: I do moral things because I have to (obligation), because I want to (volition), and because I care (compassion).  If this is true, then while moral norms have objective, mind-independent elements, moral justification can only be subjective.  

 

 

 

This article was re-written 6 November 2025.